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ABSTRACT 
Sovereign debt restructurings may experience marginal changes as a result of recent modifications in 
contractual terms being incorporated into new bond issues, but for the most part they will likely 
resemble what has generally worked so well in recent decades to the satis- faction of most governments 
and private creditors. The statutory reforms that have been proposed to date are highly unlikely to 
gain traction for a variety of reasons, including the prospect that they would have been stymied when 
confronted with a rogue sovereign debtor such as Argentina. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of academic economists, legal scholars, and policy 
gurus focused their attention upon the alleged inefficiencies in international financial markets that 
supposedly had contributed to systemic financial crises in Southeast Asia, Russia, Brazil—and 
especially in Argentina, the locus of the world’s largest default up to that point in time. 
 
The scribblers argued that globalization had spawned increasingly diverse, diffuse, and 
unmanageable creditor and debtor communities that posed coordination and collective-action 
problems. No longer could a relatively small syndicate of commercial banks gather quickly in New 
York or London, spurred into action by urgent telephone calls from their supervisory authorities, to 
deal with whatever financial emergency had erupted in some distant corner of the world. As a result, 
governments that lost the confidence of their bank depositors, bondholders, or bank creditors, or 
fell victim to regional ‘contagion’ effects, were claimed to be unable to work out constructive 
solutions prior to a major currency, banking, or debt crisis. 
 
After a crisis erupted, it was alleged, financial stability could only be restored through the extension 
of massive loan packages from the G-7 governments acting through the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Moreover, these financial rescues reportedly were generating moral hazard and other 
adverse systemic risks—particularly in situations where nations’ debt sustainability was questionable. 
And when sovereign liabilities needed to be restructured or written down, the story went, the 
absence of an orderly sovereign bankruptcy mechanism meant that workouts were delayed, and their 
effectiveness was undermined, by ‘free riders’ and ‘rogue’ (holdout) creditors. 
 
This focus on the alleged shortcomings of financial globalization, and the seeming repetition of 
currency, banking and/or sovereign debt crises, spawned various concrete proposals to reform the 
international financial architecture (Porzecanski 2005). The ‘statutory approach’ argued for the 
creation of a supranational bankruptcy authority that would adjudicate financial claims on troubled 
sovereigns in an expeditious manner, overriding contracts written in national jurisdictions. The 
‘contractual approach’, on the other hand, called for the modification of boilerplate bond clauses—
especially under New York law—in ways that would facilitate communication among creditors and 
with the sovereign debtor, restrain disruptive litigation, and enable restructuring decisions by a 
qualified majority of creditors rather than by unanimous consent. 
 
Initially, several academics urged, and the G-7 governments favoured, consideration of both 
approaches. However, this was generally resisted by both the financial industry and the largest 
sovereign issuers in the emerging markets. In the end, the government of Mexico and its bankers 
decided to issue a bond, in early 2003, subject to New York law but incorporating innovative 
‘collective action clauses’ (CACs), in exchange for the U.S. Treasury embracing the contractual 
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approach to reforms (Taylor 2007: 111–32). The transaction was successful because investors did 
not demand a premium for the contractual innovation, and ever since then, most sovereign bond 
issues under U.S. law have incorporated the said clauses at no obvious additional cost (Bradley et al. 
2010: 297, 320). 
 
The impetus to continue to reform the rules and practices of international finance subsided for 
about a decade, until the Greek financial crisis erupted in 2010–12 and led to a massive official 
rescue underwritten by the European Union (EU) and the IMF—only to result in a record- breaking 
default more than twice the size of Argentina’s a decade earlier. But it was not until long-simmering 
litigation against Argentina began to yield victories for holdout creditors in 2012–14 that the G-20 
countries mobilized to introduce a further contractual reform. 
 
The crisis in Greece engendered regrets in official and academic circles because the passage of time 
revealed that IMF and EU emergency lending had been utilized in part to finance the exit of private 
creditors in the two years ahead of the restructuring of government debt in March 2012 (IMF 2014: 
12). Moreover, while the eventual restructuring of obligations in the hands of local and foreign 
private investors achieved a very high creditor participation rate of 97 percent, despite being pre-
emptive and involving massive debt forgiveness, the IMF and mostly European policymakers and 
academics bemoaned the fact that it was not 100 percent comprehensive. The leakage of 3 percent 
was accounted by the fact that the owners of 19 of the 36 Greek government bonds subject to 
English law had not participated in the debt relief operation, because blocking majorities of holdout 
creditors had exercised their rights under those bonds’ CACs to prevent any changes to their 
payment terms (IMF 2013: 28). 
 
The saga of litigation against Argentina on the part of holdout creditors who refused to exchange 
their original bonds for new ones worth a fraction—bondholders who accounted for 7 percent of 
the government’s bonded debt in default as of 2002—became a source of concern to the IMF and a 
variety of governments and academics once the holdouts finally scored important judicial victories. 
These included a June 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision not to hear Argentina’s appeal of lower 
federal court rulings which (a) had found Argentina in breach of a clause in its defaulted bonds—the 
so-called pari passu clause—pledging to treat all bondholders equally, and (b) had prohibited 
Argentina from making payments to creditors who had accepted new bonds unless it paid also 
holdout creditors what they were owed. The governments of Brazil, France, Mexico and the United 
States filed legal briefs before the U.S. Supreme Court, stating that these rulings would have a 
negative impact on the orderly and timely conduct of sovereign debt restructurings by encouraging 
more bondholders to resist going along with future sovereign debt restructuring. Several law firms, 
academics, policy groups, and international bodies like- wise expressed their opposition to the 
verdicts (IMF 2014: 7–13). 
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THE CASE FOR STATUTORY AND CONTRACTUAL REFORMS 
 
The most outspoken critic of the existing international financial architecture has been Joseph 
Stiglitz, the hetero- dox economist who in numerous books, articles, opinion pieces and speeches 
has called for a comprehensive inter- national bankruptcy procedure to ensure the proper resolution 
of sovereign debt crises (Guzman and Stiglitz 2016a).1 Stiglitz has gone beyond the confines of 
academia to flog his ideas, serving as an advisor to, and public advocate and expert witness for, then 
Presidents Néstor and Cristina Kirchner of Argentina in their quest to impose the punishing 2005 
debt restructuring on holdouts who had court-validated rights to refuse any such cramdown (John- 
son 2014). However, Stiglitz has been surprisingly short on concrete reform proposals, putting forth 
that ‘there should be a global agreement that no country can surrender its sovereign immunity (even 
voluntarily)’ to creditors, combined with the establishment of ‘an oversight commission [made up of 
government representatives] with the mission of mediating and supervising the [debt] restructuring 
pro- cess’ of sovereigns (Guzman and Stiglitz 2016a: 22).2 
 
José Ocampo, Stiglitz’s colleague at Columbia University, has been inspired by the dispute-
settlement process at the World Trade Organization (WTO), which follows three consecutive stages 
with clear deadlines: one of voluntary negotiations, a second of mediation, and a final of arbitration, 
if the former two fail. He has been advocating for a similar mechanism to be established for 
sovereign debt restructurings, possibly to be hosted by the IMF but independent of it, to ensure a 
process that would be efficient, impartial and speedy with a result that is binding on all parties 
involved (Ocampo 2016). 
 
Jürgen Kaiser, of Jubilee Germany, has been advocating for a state insolvency process through 
international arbitration, an updated version of proposals which first circulated in the 1990s, because 
in his view both the sovereign debtor as well as good-faith creditors have the most to win through 
an impartially facilitated compromise.3 He does not call for a new international organization, nor a 
                                                 
1 ‘The current non-system does not achieve the described objectives of restructuring. Instead, it creates a host of 
inequities as well as inefficiencies. It overpenalizes debtors in distress, causing delays in the recognition of the problems. 
It leads to the ‘too little, too late’ syndrome. In some cases, there is too much lending—and too much suffering later on; 
in other cases, there may be too little lending. Moreover, the legal frameworks permit a situation in which a few 
specialized agents (the vulture funds) can block the finalization of a restructuring, imposing large costs on the debtor and 
on other creditors’ (Guzman and Stiglitz 2016a: 10). 
2 ‘The commission would not rule over different alternatives. Instead, the sovereign would finalize the process with a 
final proposal and the commission would produce statements about the reasonability of the process and the final 
proposal. This approach would serve to legitimate the restructuring or, alternatively, to legitimate positions that speak of 
illegitimate restructurings.’ (Guzman and Stiglitz 2016a: 22). 
3 In the mid-1990s, Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes had called for the establishment of an independent agency 
that ‘could provide mediation and conciliation services in negotiations between the debtor and creditors and, if desired 
by the parties themselves, binding arbitration’ (Eichengreen and Portes 1995: 43), but the earliest proposal for an ad-hoc 
debt arbitration process was put forth by the Austrian economist Kunibert Raffer in the late 1980s (Raffer 1990). With 
some of its features further developed, this concept was later on adopted by NGOs campaigning for debt relief as part 
of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign, and is nowadays referred to as the Fair and Transparent Arbitration Process (Fritz and 
Hersel 2002). 
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costly bureaucracy, but rather for a liaison office to arrange for ad hoc mediation, conciliation and 
arbitration services, with panels nominated freely by the parties based on a mutual agreement, 
whenever sovereigns are looking for a comprehensive solution to their looming or acute sovereign 
debt problems (Kaiser 2016). 
 
As of early 2017, none of these statutory reforms or any others had gained traction, whereas certain 
draft contractual reforms had earned strong support in G-20 official circles, were adopted by law in 
Europe, and have been incorporated by a number of sovereign debtors and accepted by bond- 
holders elsewhere. The first reform involves the introduction of so-called ‘super-CACs’ containing 
aggregation provisions. Their purpose is to limit the ability of holdout creditors to impede 
restructurings acceptable to a supermajority of creditors, because whereas voting under existing 
CACs is to be carried out by holders of one bond series at a time, the new clauses contemplate 
aggregated, simultaneous voting across all debt instruments subject to a restructuring with binding 
effect on all bond series. 
 
In the wake of growing concern that the Greek restructuring of March 2012 would encourage more 
holdouts in the future, the European Council decided, and the treaty establishing the European 
Stability Mechanism enshrined, that as of the start of 2013 a new aggregation clause would be 
mandatorily included in all new euro-area government securities with a maturity greater than one 
year.4 In August 2014, following an extensive consultative process with financial intermediaries, the 
International Capital Market Association (ICMA) published suggested wording for aggregation 
CACs to be utilized by sovereign issuers around the world, and these clauses have since come into 
use with Mexico once again taking the lead (Makoff and Kahn 2015; Gelpern et al. 2016).5 During 
the period from 1 October 2014 to 31 October 2016, there were 228 international sovereign bond 
placements, for a total nominal principal amount of approximately US$ 262 billion (excluding 
Eurozone issues). And, out of these, 154 bonds, issued by 49 different sovereigns representing about 
74 percent of the nominal principal amount of total issuance, included the super-CACs (IMF 2016: 
3). 
 
The second reform involved the introduction of a model pari passu clause, responding to concerns 
about the implications of the Argentina litigation for future bonds, as voiced by the IMF and G-20 
governments (IMF 2016: 2–3). The proposed language was likewise first published by ICMA in 
August 2014, intending to mitigate the risk that other courts would read into the clause the 
interpretation given by the U.S. courts in the case of Argentina’s clause. It explicitly states that while 
                                                 
4 Bonds issued by euro-area sovereigns are required to include a CAC that allows for either a series-by-series or a two-
limb aggregated voting procedure. The latter enables differential treatment among creditors. For additional background 
and details, see Hofmann (2014). 
5 In order to accommodate stylistic differences between legal markets, ICMA published in May 2015 two different 
versions of the model clauses, one for English-law bonds and another for New York-law bonds, see 
www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/ Resources/ICMA-Standard-CACs-Pari-Passu-and-Creditor-Engagement-
Provisions—May-2015.pdf, accessed 23 March 2017. 
  6 
a debt will rank pari passu with all other unsecured debt of the issuer, there is no implied 
requirement that the issuer must pay its debts at the same time (technically, on an equal or ratable 
basis).6 The model pari passu clause has been adopted in tandem with the super-CACs by most 
sovereigns issuing new debt between 1 October 2014 and 31 October 2016 (IMF 2016: 5). 
 
THE CASE AGAINST STATUTORY REFORMS 
 
It would appear that those who have been advocating for statutory reforms of the international 
financial architecture are not persuaded that the latest round of contractual reforms is sufficient to 
remedy whatever deficiencies they perceive. Stiglitz, for instance, recently wrote about Argentina’s 
settlement with its holdout creditors: 
 
This resolution will carry a high price for the inter- national financial system, 
encouraging other funds to hold out and making debt restructuring virtually impossible 
(Guzman and Stiglitz 2016b) 
 
His colleague Ocampo, for his part, had previously written: 
 
The most important effect of the U.S. rulings, how- ever, is that they discourage any 
future voluntary debt renegotiation, for obvious reasons: if investors know they have a 
chance to claim full payment through the courts, why would they take part in any 
restructuring? (Ocampo 2014) 
 
It is not hard to disagree with these pessimistic assessments for several reasons. First, the record 
shows that most sovereign debt restructurings have been handled expeditiously despite the absence 
of a world sovereign bankruptcy regime. Neither the threat nor the act of litigation, nor isolated 
instances of ‘rogue creditor’ behaviour, have thwarted the debt restructurings that have needed to be 
accomplished. 
 
According to a Moody’s analysis of 34 sovereign bond restructurings from 2008 through early 2013, 
the evidence shows that negotiations between sovereigns and their private creditors have proceeded 
fairly quickly, such that on average debt restructurings were completed within seven months after 
the start of negotiations.7 In only two cases have holdout creditors represented more than ten 
percent of the value of outstanding bonds, and in just one of those instances—that of Argentina—
did the holdouts engage in persistent litigation (Duggar 2013). This is the case because most 
                                                 
6 ICMA (2014); see also the prior note and citation for the May 2015 version of the provision as tailored for sovereign 
bonds governed by New York law. 
7 This average would be considerably shorter if the sample were to exclude the longest delays, which had to do with 
unique restructuring strategies and the parallel restructuring of official sector and commercial loan debt simultaneously 
with the restructuring of the bond instruments (Duggar 2013). 
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sovereigns have made reasonable debt relief demands from their creditors and have pursued good-
faith negotiations—whereas Argentina did neither. In fact, the unilateral, coercive and aggressive 
mode with which the authorities in that country went about managing, defaulting and restructuring 
their debt obligations stands out in a comprehensive academic study of the nature of past sovereign 
debt disputes: 
 
The well-known case of Argentina from 2001 to 2005 displays an exceptional degree of 
coerciveness, as the government officially declares a default, sticks to the proclaimed 
moratorium by stopping all payments to its bondholders for four years, freezes foreign 
assets, and rejects any meaningful negotiations (Enderlein et al. 2012: 261). 
 
Second, by now most international sovereign bonds include the first-generation CACs binding 
investors in any one debt instrument to the decisions of a supermajority, and as mentioned above, 
the bulk of new bonds issued since late 2014 include the super-CACs. Indeed, whereas at the end of 
2002 a mere one-third of international sovereign bonds featured CACs, by late 2016 that proportion 
had risen to almost 80 percent (IMF 2016: 7). While the first- generation CACs do not eliminate the 
holdout problem witnessed during the Greek debt restructuring of 2012, which was a minor one 
involving creditors obtaining blocking position in particular bond series, they would have minimized 
Argentina’s significant holdout problem if they had figured in that country’s obligations. However, 
because Argentina’s default in late 2001 involved mostly bonds issued during the 1990s, very few of 
them included CACs and the bulk required the unanimous consent of their owners for any 
amendments to their payment terms—the feature which attracted, and then empowered, holdouts 
(Duggar 2014). 
 
Third, sovereigns are free to repurchase whichever bonds they regard as potentially problematic—
for instance because they do not feature first- or second-generation CACs—while issuing new ones 
with whatever promissory language they are prepared to honour. The fact that no sovereign issuer is 
known to have engaged in such a liability-management operation to accelerate the incorporation of 
the enhanced contractual provisions (IMF 2016: 7) suggests that most sovereigns do not 
contemplate ever managing, defaulting on, and restructuring their debt obligations in the same 
unilateral, coercive, aggressive and ultimately self-defeating manner as Argentina did. 
 
Fourth, pari passu language is usually not as holdout- friendly as was the one in Argentina’s 
indentures from the 1990s at the heart of the country’s default. Pari passu clauses are a standard 
feature of sovereign bond contracts, but there are three major formulations, the most common of 
which appears in the majority of sovereign bonds issued over the past two decades, and in almost all 
bonds issued earlier—and it is not suitable for Argentina-style litigation (Duggar 2014: 2).8 
                                                 
8 The pari passu clause in the old Argentine bonds reads as follows: ‘[t]he Securities will constitute… direct, 
unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic and shall at all time rank pari passu without 
any preference among themselves. The payment obligations of the Republic under the Securities shall at all times rank at 
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Moreover, there already is one case where a holdout creditor tried but failed to use the ruling in the 
Argentina case as a suitable precedent. The Export–Import Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) 
chose not to participate in the restructuring of Grenada’s debt in 2005, and in March 2013 the bank 
filed a lawsuit against Grenada based on the pari passu violation argument used against Argentina. 
However, in August 2013, the federal district court in New York ruled that the Argentina decision 
was limited to Argentina’s unique set of circumstances and did not apply to Grenada’s (Alfaro 2015: 
70–71). 
 
Fifth, the threat of holdout creditors actually has been a force mainly for good in the international 
financial land- scape. Sovereign distressed-debt investors have been characterized as disruptive to 
the restructuring process and unfair to the creditors that participate in restructurings. However, just 
like distressed-debt investors can expedite business reorganizations and protect going-concern enter- 
prise values in the private sector (Goldschmid 2005), ‘vulture investors’ can and often do play a 
salutary role in the sovereign debt context by advancing creditor rights (Fisch and Gentile 2004: 
1097–1101). 
 
Unlike many risk- and confrontation-averse institutional and retail investors, opportunistic investors 
are more likely to challenge aggressive sovereigns and motivate them to make a better offer than 
they would otherwise make to the meeker creditors. In the case of Argentina, tens of thousands of 
elderly retail investors benefited from the litigation spearheaded by the distressed-debt investors 
(Mander 2016)—and hundreds of thousands more would have benefited if the wheels of justice had 
only turned faster. Holdout litigation can also serve as a potential check on opportunistic defaults by 
sovereign debtors, and it was sorely missing in the blatant case of Ecuador in 2008–09 (Porzecanski 
2010). It boggles the mind that so much of the academic and policymaking literature has ignored the 
realistic possibility that rogue sovereign debtors like Argentina, rather than holdout private creditors, 
are the ones that pose the greater threat to the integrity and efficiency of the international financial 
architecture (Porzecanski 2005: 331). 
 
Sixth, Argentina’s behaviour during 2002–2015 demonstrates why none of the proposed statutory 
reforms would work in the case of a similarly recalcitrant, dishonourable sovereign debtor. If 
governments around the globe were to agree not to surrender their sovereign immunity voluntarily 
when accessing the leading financial markets, as Stiglitz has proposed, then uncreditworthy 
sovereigns like Argentina would never be able to raise funding outside their own borders. Argentina 
sold the then largest-ever amount of bonds placed abroad by any emerging-market economy after 
                                                 
least equally with all its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness…’ (Duggar 2014: 
2). The U.S. federal courts interpreted it as requiring equal ranking of payment obligations under the relevant debts, and 
they prevented Argentina from making payments to the restructured bondholders without first making a ‘ratable 
payment’ to the holdout creditors (IMF 2014: 37–44). 
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making up with its creditors (Platt and Moore 2016)— but only after surrendering its sovereign 
immunity irrevocably, as it had always done prior to the 2001 default. 
 
And if there were to be an oversight commission made up of government representatives with the 
mission of mediating and supervising the debt restructuring process of sovereigns, then Argentina 
would not have accomplished a restructuring when it wanted it, because in 2002 the country was 
barely on speaking terms with the official international community. In fact, Argentina at the time 
also defaulted to its official bilateral creditors (namely, the world’s export-credit and foreign-aid 
agencies)—and it remained in default to them for over a dozen years (Mander 2014). It is hard to 
conceive that the country would have turned to a group of foreign government officials for 
mediation and supervision in the early 2000s, when it was in such a confrontational mood. 
 
In terms of a dispute-settlement process for sovereign debtors akin to that for trade disputes at the 
WTO, that would not have worked well, either. During the past two decades, Argentina has been 
the target of more trade complaints triggering dispute-settlement procedures than any country in 
Latin America—more than any other developing country except for China and India, in fact (WTO 
2015). In recent years, Argentina went through a heated WTO dispute-settlement process because of 
the stringent import restrictions that it imposed after 2010. The country was found guilty of 
breaking the WTO rules in 2014 and again (after an appeal) in 2015. It subsequently pledged to 
remove the restrictions by end-2015, but as of mid-2016, even the new government in Buenos Aires 
had yet to abolish all the import controls that it was supposed to remove (Baker and McKenzie 
2015; WTO 2016). This track record does not inspire confidence that any WTO- like, debt-
resolution mechanism would have met Argentina’s approval in the early 2000s unless it had validated 
the country’s aggressive debt-relief objectives. 
 
As concerns the applicability of a state insolvency process through international arbitration, the fact 
is that since 2001 Argentina has likewise been the target of numerous claims filed with tribunals 
under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC)—the most ever against a country party to those conventions. Argentina dragged 
all the cases out for as many years as possible through endless challenges and appeals, and whenever 
it lost arbitrations definitively, it either did not pay the resulting awards or it paid them in part after 
long delays (Cancel 2013; Porzecanski 2016). In this regard, Argentina’s rogue behaviour in 
connection with arbitration proceedings was consistent with its refusal to obey and pay foreign court 
judgments, and it is highly suggestive of the lack of efficacy that an arbitral vehicle for state 
insolvency matters would have had in Argentina’s case. 
 
Finally, advocacy for statutory reforms is pointless because there has not been a willingness on the 
part of most governments and most private creditors to depart from the current financial 
architecture. Governments are evidently unwilling to cede their sovereignty when it comes to such 
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important matters as their creditworthiness and capacity to respond quickly to any economic or 
financial emergency they may confront. And bond investors and commercial lenders are likewise 
unwilling to cede their creditor rights to a mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process without the 
inclination and enforcement powers to confront way- ward governments—especially now that the 
U.S. judiciary proved able to checkmate an insubordinate sovereign such as Argentina. 
 
In sum, sovereign debt restructurings may experience marginal changes as a result of recent 
modifications in contractual terms being incorporated into new bond issues, but for the most part 
they will likely resemble what has generally worked so well in recent decades to the satis- faction of 
most governments and most private creditors. The statutory reforms that have been proposed to 
date are highly unlikely to gain traction for a variety of reasons, including the prospect that they 
would have been stymied if they had been in place and were confronted with a rogue sovereign 
debtor such as Argentina. 
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